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SYNOPSIS A massive landslide occurred on the Nipigon River, north of the Town of Nipigon, Ontario, 
Canada in the early morning hours of April 23, 1990 and involved an estimated 300,000 cu m of soil. 
Although there was no loss of life, there were significant environmental and economic impacts. 
Discussed in this paper are the investigations carried out after the slide, the events prior to and 
the factors contributing to, the slide. 
INTRODUCTION 
A landslide occurred on the Nipigon River, north 
of the Town of Nipigon, Ontario, Canada in the 
early morning of April 23, 1990. The slide ex-
tended almost 350 m inshore with a maximum width 
of approximately 290 m. 
The force of the landslide caused soil to be 
pushed into the Nipigon River 300 m upstream and 
about the same distance downstream. The momen-
tum of the movement was so great that piles of 
detritus were found in the trees on the opposite 
bank of the river, likely tossed up when the 
soil hit the opposite bank. The Nipigon River 
was approximately 100 m wide at the location of 
the failure. The islands, formed by the soils 
pushed into the river, redirected the current 
and caused subsequent erosion on the west bank 
of the river opposite the slide. The redirected 
current was likely the cause of several land-
slides further south, which occurred within one 
month after this slide. 
A witness residing on the opposite bank heard 
trees breaking around 1:00 a.m. on April 23, 
1990, which is assumed to be the time of the 
start of the slide. Failure took place retro-
gressively from the river bank inland and se-
vered the fibre optics cable 300 m back from the 
river at precisely 4:01a.m., 3 hours after the 
presumed start of the slide. 
Discussions with two local residents, who know 
the river quite well, have revealed that prior 
to the slide the river bank at the location of 
the initial slide was approximately 6 m high and 
was undercut. The river at this location was 
reportedly very deep, with an estimated depth of 
almost 8.0 m. They also stated that it was 
common to have river fluctuations of up to 1.2 m 
over a 1 to 2 day period. 
The flow rate in the river is controlled by a 
hydro-electric dam located 8 km upstream, 
varying from a high in excess of 500 ems to a 
low of 113 ems. Records show that the flow in 




















Figure 1 Location of landslide. 
:educed to 150 ems by the end of the same day, 
~ncreased to 320 ems by the middle of the next 
day and reduced to 120 ems by the beginning of 
the following day (April 20). 
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Although there was no loss of life or private 
property, there were significant environmental 
and economic impacts as a result of the slide. 
The movement of the soil caused a natural gas 
pipeline, which operates under a pressure of 7 
MPa, to be displaced laterally up to 8.3 m west-
ward toward the river, leaving it suspended 
without soil support for a length of 75 m. The 
pipeline was not ruptured, although it did have 
a sharp bend in it. A major fibre optics cable 
located in the pipeline right-of-way was rup-
tured. The increased sediment load in the 
Nipigon River caused difficulties with the resi-
dential water supply for the Town of Nipigon, 
located about 13 kms downstream, and was also 
the cause of difficulties with the boiler feed-
water of a paper mill further downstream in the 
Town of Red Rock. The river is a sensitive fish 
habitat and it is suspected that the sediment 
adversely affected fish feeding routines for 
several years. 
Soon after the landslide took place, Trow 
Consulting Engineers Ltd., (Trow) was com-
missioned by the owners of the natural gas 
pipeline and by the Ontario Ministry of Natural 
Resources (MNR) to carry out a soils inves -
tigation to: 
a) establish the causes of the slide; 
b) assess the risk of further slides taking 
place in the vicinity; 
c) assess the feasibility of relocating the 
gas pipeline or rehabilitating the slide 
area; and 
d) advise on the operational procedures of the 
hydro-electric dam located upstream of the 
landslide site. 
Further investigation and study were carried out 
the following year by Ontario Hydro, operators 
of the dam upstream of the slide area, as well 
as by the Department of Civil Engineering of 
Lakehead University in Thunder Bay. Monitoring 
of the instruments and analyses are on-going. 
The investigations included air-photo inter-
pretations, the advancement of boreholes, in-
situ shear vane testing, triaxial testing, 
electric piezocone readings, installation of 
standard and modified piezometers and ther-
mistors and installation of slope indicator 
casings. Various slope stability analyses were 
also carried out. 
GENERAL GEOLOGY 
The area studied is shown on Figure 1 and covers 
the stretch of the Nipigon River between the 
mouth into Lake Helen and a railway bridge up-
stream of the landslide. The predominant land-
form in this area is a glaciolacustrine plain 
and delta consisting of sands and silts. The 
local relief is relatively low with generally 
poor drainage conditions. The sides of river 
valleys which have been deeply incised into 
these fine grained deposits are frequently 
highly dissected and are susceptible to rill-
and- gully erosion on freshly cut ditch slopes 
and highway backslopes. Higher and steeper 
natural and man-made slopes are subject to the 
development of small failures (Mollard and 
518 
Mallard, 1981). 
Figure 2 is a reproduction of an aerial 
photograph taken shortly after the occurrence of 
the landslide and shows the Nipigon River and 
the areas where failures have occurred. Some of 
the slumps are most likely due to the deflected 
current from this landslide under study here. 
It can be seen, as a common factor, that the 
slides are located on the outside sections of 
the river meanders - where bank erosion is at 
its greatest. 
Air photo analyses showed that this area of the 
river has experienced bank failures in the 
past - even prior to the construction of the up-
stream hydro dam in 1931. This section of land 
is very wet with poor surface drainage, possibly 
adding to the relative instability of the banks 
in this area. 
Figure 2 Aerial photograph of landslide. 
FIELD WORK 
The locations of boreholes and ground 
instrumentation installed as part of the 
investigation of the landslide are shown on a 
site plan on Figure 3 and in a stratigraphic 
section on Figure 4. Field work has been 
carried out independently by three agencies. 
Trow Investigation 
The field work for the initial and immediate in-
vestigation by Trow consisted of advancing two 
boreholes at the river bank immediately north of 
the failure zone. Borehole No. 1 was drilled to 
a depth of 21.9 m and Borehole No. 2 to a depth 
of 12.8 m. A slope indicator casing to measure 
on-going soil movements was installed in 
Borehole No. 1. One piezometer and one stand-
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Figure 3 Site Plan 
pipe were installed in Borehole No. 2 to at 
depths of 10.8 m and 6.4 m respectively. In 
addition, five boreholes were advanced near the 
natural gas pipeline. 
Soil samples were taken at 1.5 m intervals with 
a standard split spoon sampler. Attempts were 
also made to obtain Shelby tube samples in the 
cohesive strata; however, due to the very soft-
loose nature of the soils relatively undisturbed 
samples could not be obtained. 
In the more cohesive soils, field vane tests 
were performed to measure undisturbed shear 
strength and remoulded shear strength. From 
these results the sensitivity of the soil was 
determined. 
Ontario Hydro Investigation 
In July 1991, 3 boreholes were advanced by 
Ontario Hydro (Boreholes H-1, H-2 and H-3). 
Undisturbed samples were recovered by means of a 
piston sampler. Soil stratigraphy and undrained 
strength profiling was achieved by means of an 
electric piezocone and Geonor shear-vane tests. 
Pore pressure dissipation tests were performed 
in clayey layers with the piezocone to estimate 
the coefficient of consolidation of the in-situ 
deposits. 
Borehole H-1 was positioned 8 m east of the bank 
edge and close to Trow's Borehole No. 1. Bore-
hole H-2 was located about 165 m east of Bore-
hole 1 and Borehole H-3 was positioned just east 
of the landslide limit and TransCanada Pipelines 
right-of-way. Open type Geonor piezometers were 
installed at depths of 6 m, 9 m and 12 m at each 
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Highly Sensitive/ 
Clayey Silt Seam 
Figure 4 Stratigraphie Section 
of the 3 boreholes. A standpipe piezometer was 
installed in Borehole H-3 at 3 m depth to mon-
itor the perched water table in the surficial 
sand layer. 
Lakehead University Investigation 
A series of electrical piezometers together with 
thermistors were installed by Lakehead 
University. Four modified semiconductor type 
piezometers were located in the upper sand at 
depths between 1.5 m to 2.0 m, and two vibrating 
wire type instruments were installed at 3.0 
metre depth in the upper clayey silt and at 12 
metre depth in the lower clayey silt. The 
ground temperatures were recorded at these 
points as well as at two additional locations in 
the clear cut area. 
LABORATORY TESTING 
Moisture contents, Atterberg limits and grain 
size analyses were obtained from selected 
samples as part of the Trow iPvestigation. 
Table I presents a summary of these results. 
TABLE I SUMMARY OF TROW LABORATORY TESTING 
.....LB w, w, z, x, 
' SJUII> \ SILT 'ClJ!.Y 
BH-l 1.5 - 2.1 m 25 71 
BB-1 3.0 - 3.6 m 45 .. 5 24.7 20.8 0.33 31.5 
BB-1 4.9 - s.s m 39.0 18 .. 9 20.1 0.97 38.4 74 24 
BB-1 12.2 - 12.Saa 22.5 15 .. 7 6.8 2.87 35.2 69 30 
Silt Block 30 64 6 
Clay Block 68 28 
Notea: 




- Pla•t:Lcity Iadex 
.. •• - Liqqid.ity Index 
s. .... 
- MOiet~• Content 
SUBSURFACE CONDITIONS 
Generally, a silty SAND stratum is overlying a 
clayey SILT, beneath which there is another 
silty SAND/sandy SILT layer. Beneath the lower 
SILT/SAND, interbedded, very soft, SILT and more 
plastic CLAY/SILT layers are found. The sub-
surface conditions can be seen on the geological 
section shown on Figure 4 and the river bank 
section shown on Figure 5. 
The characteristics of each of the main soil 
types encountered are summarized in the 
following sections. 
Third International Conference on Case Histories in Geotechnical Engineering 
Missouri University of Science and Technology 
http://ICCHGE1984-2013.mst.edu
SILTY SAND 
This stratum consists of generally loose silty 
SAND, and ranges in thickness between 1 m to 3 
m. 
CLAYEY SILT 
The clayey SILT stratum generally has clay frac-
tions ranging from 20% to 30%. It characteris-
tically has very high moisture contents, usually 
near, or even higher than its liquid limit. 
Measured liquid limits range from 22% to 39% 
with plastic limits in the order of 16% to 20%. 
In-situ field vane tests show that the top 
section of this stratum has peak undrained shear 
strengths ranging from 48 to 86 kPa and sensi-
tivities in the order of 2 to 4. Below this, in 
the more soft and saturated zone, the in-situ 
strengths range from 19 to 34 kPa with moderate 
sensitivities ranging from 1.9 to 2.9. The 
field vane shear values were considerably higher 
than the piezocone and laboratory triaxial 
strength values obtained by Ontario Hydro 
(Radhakrishna et al, 1992). The effective 
strength parameters of this unit as determined 
by consolidated undrained triaxial compression 
tests are c' = 12.8 kPa and¢' = 30°. 
(Radhakrishna et al, 1992) 
The boreholes near the gas pipeline showed this 
stratum to be very soft and wet throughout its 
depth with the same relatively low shear 
strengths yet with relatively high sensitivi-
ties. This renders the soil subject to easy 
lique-faction and failure upon disturbance. 
SANDY SILT 
The sandy SILT stratum generally has sand 
fractions ranging from 14% to 30%. It is 
generally compact with SPT values of 18 to 35 
blows/ft and moisture contents ranging from 18% 
to 22%. The stratum appears to be stratified 
with evidence of interbedded fine sand and -~silt. 
This stratum is 3 to 5 m thick. 
INTERBEDDED SILT AND CLAYEY SILT 
At greater depth there is an interbedded SILT 
and clayey SILT stratum. The upper portion of 
this stratum is stiffer but with increasing 
depth the silt becomes very soft with a moisture 
content in the order of 33%. The clayey SILT is 
darker grey in colour and stiffer than the SILT, 
with higher plasticity and a moisture content in 
the order of 56%. The SILT layers are up to 150 
mm in thickness, while the clayey SILT layers 
are generally 25 to 50 mm in thickness. In-situ 
vane tests showed that this stratum has an 
undrained shear strength ranging from 19 to 34 
kPa. The remoulded strength of this layer 
ranges from 1.3 to 2.6 kPa indicating a high 
sensitivity of 10 to 15. A thin, very soft, 
light grey clayey silt zone of very high sen-
sitivity was encountered at 12.0 m depth. 
The liquidity index of the entire unit is 
greater than 1.0 with a strong susceptibility 
for liquefaction upon disturbance. The effec-
tive strength parameters of this unit near its 
top portion are c' = 5 kPa and¢' = 25° 
(Radhakrishna et al, 1992). 
520 
The boreholes advanced in the area near the 
pipeline did not indicate the stiffer clayey 
SILT in the upper portion of the stratum as was 
found in the Trow Boreholes, Nos. 1 and 2, but 
showed low undrained shear strengths throughout 
its depth (9.6 to 38.3 kPa as compared to 48.0 
to 86.0 kPa indicated in the boreholes at the 
river's edge). 
SLOPE INDICATOR READINGS AND INTERPRETATION 
A slope indicator casing was installed in Trow 
Borehole No. 1 to a depth of 21.9 m. Readings 
were subsequently taken between May 25 and June 
25, 1990. The readings indicated that there 
were movements still taking place within 16 m of 
the surface in the general direction of the 
river several months after the slide occurred. 
SLOPE STABILITY 
Trow Analysis 
A stability analysis was performed by Trow on 
the river bank configuration as drawn in Figure 
5. The analysis was performed using the com-
mercial program SLIDE,developed at the 
University of Toronto. This program is based on 
Bishop's Simplified Method of Slices with 
circular slip surfaces. 
The piezometric level used in the analysis by 
Trow was based on the water levels measured in 
the standpipes and piezometers after instal-
lation as well as on field observations and 
information from the borehole logs. Two water 
levels were considered: 
1) 
2) 
a high groundwater level based on seepage 
zones observed near the toe of the slope 
immediately after the slide took place and 
on zones of free water found during 
borehole sampling; and 
a low groundwater level as measured from 
the standpipes and related to the lowest 
river elevations measured during the field 
program. 
Material Parameters 
Because undisturbed samples could not be ob-
tained in the Trow investigation, the strength 
parameters were estimated from the Atterberg 
values, the in-situ vane shear tests, and cor-
relations with the 'N' values from SPT tests. 
The soil parameters used in the stability 
analysis are summarized in Table II. 
TABLE II Soil Parameters Used In Stability 
Analyses 
Soil Type Unit Friction Cohesion c' 
Weight Angle kPa 
kN/cu.rn </J' 
Sandy SILT 17.6 30° 0 
Clayey SILT 19.0 28° (30°) 30 (12.8) 
Very Soft Clayey SILT 18.2 28° (25°) 0 (5) 
Note: Numbers in brackets are Ontario Hydro's values for 
comparison 
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Figure 5 River Bank Configuration 
~esults of the Slope Stability Analysis 
rhis stability analysis was used for discussion 
?Urposes only and as an indication of how the 
civer bank's stability would be affected by 
iifferent groundwater conditions. 
[n particular it was attempted to determine the 
rroundwater conditions at the time of failure. 
1our main cases were investigated and the 
:esults are presented on Figures 6 to 9, showing 
:he slope configuration and the respective 
rroundwater conditions used. Each of the cases 
.s described below: 
:ase No.1 
n Case No. 





ase No. 2 
1 the conditions of the slope at the 
soils investigation were invest-
a low river water level (prior to 
flow) and the lowest measured 
elevations in the standpipe and 
The results are shown on Figure 6. 
n Case No. 2 the condition of a high river 
evel with the groundwater level at the same 
evel as the river elevation was analyzed. The 
esults are shown on Figure 7. 
:ase No. 3 
n Case No. 3 spring conditions were simulated 
·ith high river levels and a high groundwater 
evel with seepage at the toe, as was observed 
uring the field program. These results are 
hown on Figure 8. 
ase No. 4 
n Case No. 4 spring conditions were simulated 
ith a high groundwater level, including seepage 
t the toe of the slope, and low river levels 
or minimum flows. This situation is similar to 
drawdown condition. The results for this case 
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Figure 6 Slope stability analysis - Case 1 
BH-2 
.. 
.· Silty Sand 
/ /--+-f.:'~-i-----::-,...:.---; Clayey~ 






5 10 15 20 25 30 
-----
.:.--.:.;;:;:;= ..... 
DISTANCE ( m ) 
Figure 7 Slope stability analysis - Case 2 
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Figure 8 Slope stability analysis • Case 3 
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Figure 9 Slope stability analysis • Case 4 
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The results of the analyses are summarized in 
Table III. 
TABLE III Summary of Stability Analysis 
Case No. Groundwater River Level Minimum 
Factor of Safetv 
1 low low 1. 08 
2 same as river high 1. 01 
3 high high 0.93 
4 high low 0.86 
Ontario Hydro (Radhakrishna et al, 1992) also 
performed a stability analysis on a similar slope 
configuration using the commercial computer 
program PC-SLOPE by GEO-SLOPE Programming Ltd., 
applying Bishop's simplified method along with 
the soil suction option. The Factors of Safety 
for various conditions were determined and com-
pared with a base case. Their results yielded 
Factors of Safety ranging from 0.85 to 1.1. 
COMMENTS 
The results of both analyses are very similar, 
with Factors of Safety close to one in all 
cases. The most significant drop in stability 
was found to be related to an increase of the 
piezometric pressure head by about four metres 
during spring. The results, which indicate that 
the river banks have marginal stability, even 
under the most favourable groundwater and river 
level conditions, are supported by evidence of 
numerous old and new slides throughout the 
glaciolacustrine deposit along the river. 
Examination of the results show further that the 
most critical slip circles are near the toe of 
the slope. The surficial silty sand stratum is 
unstable in some areas, suggesting minor surface 
sloughing on the upper bank. The slip surfaces 
reaching further back into the slope showed much 
higher factors of safety. 
Thus, the analysis indicates that the slide 
started as a small slip at the river bank and 
did not fail as a whole entity, but retrogressed 
uphill after initial failure occurred. 
This assumption is also supported by the 
following evidence: 
1. A witness residing on the west bank of the 
river opposite the slide area heard the 
trees cracking and breaking at the river 
bank around 1:00 a.m. on April 23, 1990 
whereas the Bell Telephone fibre optics 
cable was severed at the pipeline at 4:01 
a.m., indicating that the slide 
retrogressed from the river bank to the 
pipeline (300 m) in a 3 hour time period; 
and 
2. the detritus in the slide pushed out into 
the river shows no evidence that materials 
from behind the riverbank was riding up 
over material in place, as would be the 
case if the slide had started at the 
pipeline. 
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The fact that the slide debris was moving 
against the very swift current of the river for 
about 400 metres before it stopped, as well as 
the lateral deflections of the gas pipeline, 
suggest that the forces mobilized by the soil 
movement were very large. It appears also that 
the movements of soil were intermittent and may 
have been interrupted by several pauses before 
the final movements occurred which caused the 
rupture of the telephone cable about three hours 
later. 
The main causes for the retrogression of the 
slide appear to be higher than normal ground-
water levels in combination with highly 
sensitive soil deposits. The slide kept retro-
gressing after the initial slip occurred at the 
river bank and the slope oversteepened. Blocked 
drainage due to the debris of the initial slide 
led to the continued series of failures. 
The depth of the slide seems to be at, or near, 
the lower sandy SILT stratum and may be deter-
mined by a seam of highly sensitive soil which 
was detected at Ontario Hydro Borehole H-1 just 
below the lower sandy SILT stratum (shown on 
Figure 4). The slide kept retrogressing upslope 
until sufficient resistance was met. It appears 
that the pipeline helped to stop the landslide 
retrogression. 
The higher than normal groundwater pressure 
existed at the time of the landslide due to warm 
weather and heavy rainfall immediately prior to 
the slide and the recent timber harvesting oper-
ations uphill of the slide area. During a site 
visit on April 24, 1990, the day after the slide 
occurred, it was apparent that the frost was out 
of the ground in the cut-over area with water 
pending on the surface, whereas in the tree 
covered areas and in the landslide zone, the 
ground was still frozen. Thus, in the cut-over 
area~ surface water could penetrate into the 
ground, recharging the groundwater in the soils 
of the failure area, which were still capped and 
confined by the overlying frozen ground. Simi-
larly, some recharging could also have taken 
place in the cleared pipeline right-of-way. 
Figure 10 illustrates these points. 
The qualitative observations in April 1990 were 
confirmed by ground temperature measurements on 
May 12, 1992 at various locations within the 
forested area and within the clear-cut area 
uphill from the landslide. While the ground 
surface within the forested area was at, or 
below, 0°C down to a depth of about 0.5 to 1.0 
metres, the ground within the clear-cut area was 
completely thawed, ranging between +l0°C near 
the ground surface to a low of +3°C at 1.0 m 
depth. 
It should be noted that the clear-cut area 
uphill of the landslide is a shallow south and 
southwest facing bowl-shaped slope which absorbs 
sun radiation in the early spring. Surface 
water from snow melt and precipitation is col-
lected in this area, readily recharging the 
groundwater in the lower lying slope portions. 
The surficial soils in the clear-cut slope area 
are fine sands, which taper out towards the rock 
outcrops further uphill and most likely connect 
with the two sand horizons further downhill (see 
geological section on Figure 4). 
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Recharge of Groundwater 










Figure 10 Model for soil saturation. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The landslide that retrogressed from the east 
bank of the Nipigon River eastward to disrupt 
the gas pipeline likely started as a small slide 
at the river bank. Small slides are common 
along the outside bends of the Nipigon River, 
whereas retrogressive failures of the extent 
observed on April 23, 1990, are not. 
Contributing factors to the river bank failure 
that started the landslide include: 
a) toe erosion at the river bank as a result 
of the presence of easily erodible material 
and of high flow velocities; 
b) higher than normal groundwater pressure in 
the river bank area, as evidenced by 
seepage out of the bank; 
c) lowering of water levels in the Nipigon 
River which probably occurred more quickly 
than the river bank soils could drain, thus 
reducing the factor of safety and creating 
the potential for localized surface 
failures (rapid drawdown condition). 
Probable factors that caused the localized river 




the soil deposits in the area are weak and 
rather sensitive, leading to significant 
reductions in strength when disturbed; 
the higher than normal groundwater pressure 
in the soils back from the river decreased 
their shear strength and stability. The 
high groundwater pressure appeared to be 
partially due to the spring weather 
conditions in 1990 and high groundwater 
recharge in the recently cut-over areas and 
along the gas pipeline right-of-way. 
The nature of the glaciolacustrine soil deposits 
which this section of the Nipigon River 
traverses makes this area prone to bank 
failures. New slides will likely continue to 
occur at the river banks, as they have in the 
past before any development. It is possible 
that some of the small slips could result in 
large retrogressive failures such as the April 
23, 1990 landslide, if similar conditions would 
develop. 
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Man-caused activities that may have contributed 





frequent rapid changes in the river level 
due to dam operations would increase the 
risk of small localized bank slides. In an 
uncontrolled river, fluctuations would be 
less frequent and would take place over a 
longer period of time, allowing the river 
bank soils to drain; 
tree harvesting uphill of the area con-
tributed to earlier, and increased, infil-
tration and thus to high groundwater 
pressures in the soil deposits downslope; 
the cleared right-of-way constructed by the 
gas pipeline company could also have con-
tributed to increased infiltration and thus 
to high groundwater pressures. 
The following recommendations were made to 
reduce the risk of both small local river bank 




Tree harvesting uphill from the river 
within the glaciolacustrine deposits 
should not take place unless an engineering 
study is undertaken to develop strategies 
that would ensure that tree cutting would 
not contribute to increased groundwater 
recharge into these deposits. 
Operation of Ontario Hydro's darns on the 
Nipigon River should be controlled such 
that rapid drawdown conditions along the 
river banks would be avoided or minimized 
at critical time stages. Engineering 
studies should be undertaken to investigate 
seasonal ground-water levels and 
groundwater drainage patterns in order to 
establish acceptable times within which 
river lowering would be less likely to 
trigger bank failures. These studies may 
establish operational restrictions to 
reduce bank failures at certain times of 
the year or under certain weather con-
ditions. 
Areas in which surface water was pending 
along the pipeline right-of-way should be 
identified and drainage should be provided 
as needed. 
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